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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Resp-ondent, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
.Ap·peUant. 
Case No. 6-376 
RESPONDEN_T'S BRIEF 
The Respondent, Salt Lake City, eommenced an ac-
tion April 8, 1940 to quiet title to a parcel of land de-
scribed as follows: 
All of lots 8, 9 .and 10 in Block 2, Plat '' K' ', 
1Salt L·ake City Survey. 
~It was alleged in the City's 1Complaint that the Re-
spondent wa.s the owner of said land and that the Defend-
ant, State of Utah, ·claimed an interest therein, which 
interest had no foundation in law and prayed that its title 
be quieted. (R. 1-2} ·The Defendant, Sltate of Utah, filed 
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2 
its general D·emurrer (1R. 4), which De~urrer was by 
the .District ·C·ourt on May 6, 1940 overruled. (R. 6) The 
Defendant filed its answer May 17, 1'940 by which it 
denied P'laintiff''s ownership of the land described in the 
eomplaint and alleged that said land was conveyed by 
deed for a valuable consideration to the State of Utah 
July 9, 18'.95, which deed was exe·cuted by the Plaintiff 
who then was the owner thereof and who conveyed a good 
title to the Defendant. That the Defendant had, since 
said date, !been in posse·ssion ·of said land and at the time 
of the filing of the answer owned the same. (R. 8, ~ and 
10) The Plaintiff, .Salt Lake City, filed its Amended 
Reply September 2·6, 1940 wherein it alleged that Plain-
tiff, being the owner of said land descrihed in the com-
plaint, conveyed the same by deed to the Defendant July 
9, 189·5, which deed is attached ·to paragraph 2 of its 
Amended Reply as an Exhibit and as a part of said 
Reply, and after the words of conveyance and deserip-
tion of the pr·operty carried. the following qualification: 
'·'i8o long as ·said premises shall he used for a mansion or 
residenc~ :by the E·xecutive of said territory for the State 
of Utah. 
But in case said property shall not be used by said 
territory or ·State for an executive mansion or residence 
then this deed shall become void and of no effe-ct and said 
proper~ty, with all the impr·ovements and appurtenances 
thereon or thereunto belonging, shall revert to and be-
eo me the property of the said first party as fully and 
absolutely as if this deed had not been 1nade. '' (R. 17) 
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It is further alleg·ed by the Plaintiff's Amended 
Reply that said real property des~ribed in the complaint 
was conveyed to and received by the Defendant upon the 
above described limitation and qualification and that the 
Defendant, ·State of Utah, had not so used it, but on 
the contrary, and pursuant to Chapter 1~51, Laws of Utah, 
1937, did accept .a. conveyance of land and residenee 
located thereon for its E·xHcutive Mansion from one 
,Jennie J. Kearn·s, which land and residence has since 
its conveyance to said Defendant April 28, 19;37, been 
kept, used and maintained by the ·State of Utah as the 
residence and Executive Mansion of the Governor of 
Utah. That by reason thereof the land described in the 
Plaintiff's complaint reverted to and became the property 
of S.alt Lake City. (R. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19). 
·The case ·was tried N.ovem;ber 28, f940 before the 
Honorable Bryan P. Leverich in Salt Lake City. (R. 
2·3) Thereafter and on February 13, 1941 the said Third 
District C·ourt made the following order: ''The within 
case having been heretofore submitted to the Court with-
out argument, and by the :Court taken under advisement, 
and the Court now, after ·eonsidering the evidence and 
all the authorities cited, orders that Plaintiff be granted 
a de,cree quieting its title to the real estate described in 
Plaintiff's complain~ as prayed." (R. 22) 
~Ou February 18, 1g.41 the same Court n1ade its find-
ings of fact by \vhich it found that the Plaintiff, Salt Lake 
City, owned the real property and eonveyed the same on 
.July f), 189·5 to Defendant, State of Utah, as alleged in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'4 
Plaintiff's Amended R.eply, upon the limitation and 
qualification set out in said deed and that the real prop-
erty descrilbed in said deed reverted to and became the 
property of Salt Lake City, Plaintiff, as it was not used 
nor intended to be used by appellant as an Executive 
Mansion or residence. That the Defendant, State of Utah, 
failed to use said real property for the Governor's resi-
dence, acquired another parcel of land for that purpose 
and abandoned the use of said real property above de-
s·cribed as a Governor's residence and terminated its fee 
therein (R. 24, 2,5 and 2:6) and the said 1Court concluded 
that the said real property reverted to the Plaintiff. (H. 
2'6, 27) Judgment was entered February 18, 19,41 quiet-
ing title to the real property described in Plaintiff's com-
plaint in .Salt Lake City. (R. 28) Notice of the decision 
of the Court w.as given to Defendant, ~state of Utah, 
Fehruary ·20, 1941. The D·efendant, ~State of Utah, served 
and filed its Notice of Appeal May 2, 1941. ·Three errors 
were assigned by Defendant ·On .June 12, 1941 as follows: 
1. Finding of Fact Number 6. 
2. C:onclusion of Law Number 1. 
3. The Judgment. 
No Bill of Exceptions was settled or filed. Appellant 
filed its Brief June 24, 1941 wherein it is contended that 
the c·ourt erred in the 3 particulars set out in its As-
signment of Errors. (Appellant's Brief, pages 6 and 1). 
As above noted we have before us for consideration 
only the pleadings in determining whether or not the 
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Court erred in making its Finding· of F,Jtct No. 6, its Con-
"' elusion of La\\~ No. 1 and its Judgn1ent. 
' ·, The Finding of Fact No. 6 assigned as error by Ap-
pellant is based upon the evidence received by the Court 
at the trial of the case and since there is not before us 
any of the evidence it seems that \Ye must, as a matter 
of la\Y, assume that the Finding· of F·act is amply sup-
ported by the evidence received at the trial. 
The Conclusion of La\Y No. 1 assigned as error lby 
I 
__ Appellant is 1ba.sed upon the Findings of Fa:ct. No c-on-
~- tention is made that the Findings of Fact do not support 
_! this conclusion. If the ,C:onclusion is one which may be 
- lawfully made from the Findings of Ftact then the as-
signm·ent by Plaintiff that the Conclusion is erroneous 
should fail. No contention is made ~by the Appellant that 
- the pleadings of the Plaintiff, that is, the Complaint and 
,_ 
,. the Amended Reply, failed to state a cause of action, nor 
~~ is any such ·contention ·tenable. The Judgment is sup-
ported by the pleadings. Since we have before us only 
the pleading·s for consideration, it seems to us that, if 
the pleadings state a cause of action, the assignment 
rnade by Appellant that Court erred in making its judg-
jr:· 1nent should fail. 
~ 
m: 
~i No motion for a new trial was made. ·The Defend-
~ ant has brought as its record on appeal only the- judgment 
0 roll (1Seetion 104-30-14, R. S. U. 19133). No bill -of excep-
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6 
tions is included in the record (!Section 104-39-4, R. S. U. 
1933). Where the evidence ha~ not been brought up and 
presented to this Court by a .Bill of Exceptions it must 
be presurned that such evidence is sufficient to sustain 
the judgment, 5 C. J·. S. Appeal and Error 1574 B, page 
448, and the cases ·cited in Note 55 on pages 453-4. 
The first assignment of error (Appellant's Brief, 
page 6) relates to Finding of Fact No. 6, Record, pag·e 
26, and is assigned by Appellant '''for the reason that 
the finding is based on the fact that the State had accept-
ed the Jennie J. Kearns' property to be used as a Gov-
ernor's Mansion''. The finding recites that the State 
·of Utah abandoned the use of said real property con-
veyed to it lby .S:alt Lake City for an exe·cutive mansion 
or residence. This finding is ibased upon the evidence 
adduced at the trial and it is presumed as a matter of 
laV\r that the evidence \vas sufficient to support the 
finding. 
The Court further recites in said finding that by 
the acceptance of the said real property conveyed to 
Appellant by Jennie .J. Kearns and the use by the State 
of Utah of sai.d property as its executive mansion and 
residence for its Governor, Appellant did terminate it~ 
fee in the deed of conveyance. This portion of the find-
ing is, as alleged by Appellant, based on the fact found 
by the Court that the State had accepted the Jennie J. 
Kearns' property to be used ~·~ a Governor's mansion, 
but it is also based, as is set out. in the finding, upon the 
further fa·ct of the use by the State of Utah of said Jen-
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nie J. !(earns' property as its executive mansion or resi-
dence for the Governor. The character of that lise IS 
not show'll but is presun1ed to support the findi~g\ 
It can readily be ascertained then that the finding is 
based upon 3 pojnts: 1. The abandonment by the State of 
Utah of the real property conveyed to it by the City for 
an exe~cutive. mansion or residence. 2. The a·cceptance of 
a parcel of land from Jennie J. Kearns as an executive 
mansion ·Or resiaence. 3. The ·use by the State of Utah of 
·Said Jennie J. Kearns' property as its executive mansion 
or residence. These ultimate faets found lby the Court. 
are derived from the testimony and are supp.orted by 
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Respondent's Amended 
Reply. (R. 16) 
The Court, in Finding of Fact N.o. 3 (R. 26) found 
as follo,vs: ''That the said defendant did on said day 
accept said deed and the real property therein upon the 
express limitation and qualification set out in said deed, 
that is, in the event that the property described therein 
was not used by the defendant for an executive mansion 
or residence the said realty would revert to and become 
the property of the plain tiff herein.'' 
The Court further found in its Finding of Fact No. 
4 (R. 26) as follows: "That the defendant State of Utah 
has not since the execution .and deli very of said deed or 
at any time used the real property described therein for 
an executive mansion or residence and the same has been 
and no\v is vacant and unoccupied land.'' 
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By a. reading of the Court's Finding No. 2 (:R. 24) 
and as appears from Finding No. 3 a hove quoted the deed 
from iSalt Lake City to the ~State of Utah was executed 
and delivered July 9, 1895 and was aecepted by the State 
of Utah on the same day. The findings were made and 
entered February 18, 1941, or nearly forty-six years 
after the execution and delivery of the deed to the State 
of Utah. In accordance with F[nding No. 4 above quoted 
th~ ·.State of Utah has not, during the entire period of 
nearly 46· years, used the property described in the deed 
of conveyance for any purpose or for a Governor's resi-
dence. 
As appears from Finding No.3 above quoted the Ap-
pellant, State of Utah, accepted the property described 
in said deed upon the express limitation and qualification 
that the property should be used for a mansion or resi-
dence by the exe.cutive of the territory or the State of 
Utah. The failure to use said property for a period of 
46 years as an executive mansion in and of itself, without 
some explanation, should determine the fee and terminate 
the right of the State of Utah in said land. It might be 
argued, however, that the State of Utah did not have 
sufficient funds to erect an executive mansion and was 
intending to do that some time in the future. 
Finding of F'act No. 5 ( R. 26) reads as follows: 
,., That the said defendant State of Utah pursuant to 
Chapter 1'51 of the Law·s of Utah, 1937, an act of the 
Legislature ·Of the State of Utah known as Senate Bill 
N·o. 23,6, approved and effective February 24, 1937, did 
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9 
accept a parcel of land conveyed by deed from Jennie J. 
Kearns to the said defendant iState of Utah, which con-
veyance was dated April 28, 1937, and rec-orded in the 
office of the County Re-corder of Salt Lake County in 
B·ook 198 of Deeds, pag·es 470-1, upon which land there 
existed a. residence for the express purpose of using the 
same as the residence of the Governor of the State of 
Utah, and since ·Said time said residence and real prop-
erty have !been and are now used by the defendant State 
of Utah a.s the executive mansion or residence of the 
Governor of said State.'' By this finding the State of 
Utah has definitely determined to use other property, 
to-wit, the .Jennie J. Kearns property for its executive 
mansion. It has only one executive, therefore, the argu-
= ment that it may still intend to use this property for a 
Governor's re·sidence has no force. In addition to that, 
. ·Chapter 151, Laws of Utah 1937, p-rovided as follows, 
to-wit: ''The Secretary of ·state is hereby authorized to 
accept as a gift on behalf of the State from Mrs. Jennie 
J. Kearns the property a.nd improvements thereon, lo-
:: cated at 603 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
.~ to be used as a residence of the Governor of the .State of 
~ Utah." 
By the provisions of Section 1, Chapter 158, Laws 
: ·of Utah 19·37, the sum of Fifty Th·ousand and no/100 
1 
~ ('$50,000.00) Dollars was appropriated by the State Legis-
~ lature for the ''Governor's residence, household sub-
~.:. sistance and contingent expense''. By the provision of f 1S'ection 1, ·Chapter 137, Laws of Utah 1939, the sum of 
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Thirty-one Thousand and no/100 ($31,000.00) Dollars 
was appropriated ·by the Utah L·egi~slature ''for the Gov-
ernor's residence as ·created and designated by Chapter 
1'51, Laws of Utah 1937, and the necessary expenses in-
·cident to the· Governor's residence and the household 
subsistance and contingent expense relating thereto''. 
From the reading of these ~statutes alone, without re-
·course fo the evidence as to the use made of the property 
by the Appellant it appears that the State of Utah had 
effectively determined not to use the property described 
in the R.espondent 's deed. The Appellant used the Jen-
nie J. Kearns' property from April 28, 1937, until the 
date .of these 'findings, February 18, 1941, as the residence 
for its Governor and appropriated the sum of Eighty-one 
Thousand ($81,000.00) Dollars for the n1aintenance of 
the property. 
If there was ever any doubt that the lapse of 46 years 
indica ted an intention not to use the property described 
in the deed from S:alt Lake City to the State of Utah this 
doubt is certainly destroyed and resolved in favor of 
F'inding No. 6 made by the Court when the Sta.te of Utah 
by Legislative Act accepted the Kearns property a.nd 
used it for its Governor's residence. The Court found 
by its finding No. 6 (R. 26) as follow·s: ''That the said 
defendant ·State of Utah ahandoned the use of said real 
property conveyed to it lby Salt Lake City for an execu-
tive mansion or residence a.s aforesaid and by the ac-
ceptance of the said real property conveyed to it by 
Jennie J. Kearns as aforesaid and the use by the State 
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11 
of Utah as its executive n1ansion or residen·ce for it·s 
Governor did terminate its fee in the deed eonveyirig 
the real p-roperty from Salt Lake City plaintiff to the 
State of Utah as aforesaid.'' 
The deed by which the Appellant derived its quali-
fied fee carried the following qualifieation: ''by these 
presents does grant-------~---------- ------------------------ unto the Territory 
of Utah------------------------------------------------ so long as said premises shall 
·. be used for a mansion or residen-ce by the executive of 
: said territory or State of Utah. But in case said prop-
~ erty shall not be used by s:aid territory or the s:tate for 
~ s:tn executive mansion or r~sidence then this d-eed shall 
-~ become void and of no effect and said property, with all 
: the improvements and appurtenances thereon· or thereto 
~ belonging shall revert to and become the property ·Of said 
. first party, as fully and absolutely as if this deed had 
not been made''. 
It is interesting to note that the consideration set 
t~ ·Out in said deed is the sum of One Dollar, and it is fur-
~~ ther interesting to note that the Legislature of Utah or 
n: of the Territory of Utah has not by any formal act which 
;{ appears in any of the reported proceedings, Session Laws 
:~ or C'ompiled Laws accepted the gift of the land described 
~~ in said deed !by S.alt Lake City, nor has the State of 
m~ Utah lhy its Legislature so far as its reported Session 
~e Laws or Compiled Laws indi·c~ate acknowledged that it 
~~ intended to use the property described in said deed for 
;J' any purpose. In fact, there is no legislative expres·sion 
If~ of any c:haracter affecting this real property. A state 
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acts through its legislative body and acting in this man-
ner has the same right with respect to real property as 
an individual. 59' C. J ., ·States 27,6, at page 164. 
The premises were in ac·cordance with the finding 
never used by the State for a residence for its Governor 
or for any other purpose. 
It would seem that the failure to for1nally a·ceept the 
tendered gift of tS:alt Lake City for the purpose it was 
offered and the further failure to use the land for the 
purpose limited by the deed should alone cause a rever-
sion ipso facto to the Granto-r. Attention is called to 
the fa·ct that failure to use the property for the purposes 
limited in the deed results in rever~sion to the Grantor. 
Th~ appellant, State of Utah, contends that it re-
ceived by conveyance a determinable fee sometimes 
known a.s a qualified or base fee. ('Appellant's brief, 
page 7) W·e do not disagree with this ~contention. Ap-
pellant's view is apparently that a determinable fee is 
an estate limited with a qualification annexed to it by 
which it. is provided that the fee must determine when-
ever the qualification is at an ·end. Appellant observes 
at page 8 of its brief : ~'';Such deed provides for termi-
nation of the estate of Grantee by operation of law not 
by act of the parties. * * * '' 
It is our view that any estate received by appellant 
was qualified and limited in the following: ''ISo long as 
the premises shall be used for a mansion or residence by 
the executive of the ·Territory or the ·State of Utah.'' 
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13 
The further precaution: '·'But in case said property shall 
not be used lby said Territory or State for an Executive 
mansion or residence, then this deed shall beeome void 
and of no effect a.nd said property with all the improve-
ments and appurtenances th~reon or thereunto belong-
ing shall revert, etc.'' is sin1ply a claus-e to clarify the 
intention of the Grantor that the fee granted to appel-
lant vvas lilnited solely to the use of the land for an exe-
cutive mansion or residence and upon failure to so use 
such premises the property should revert to the Grantor. 
This but states the common law rul~ as to a fee determin-
, a;ble. When the appellant's position is examined, it is 
all the more apparent that the land should revert to the 
Grantor. What us-e of the land does appellant ·Contend 
it has made~ The answer is, obviously, none. 
What ·Opportunity has the appellant had to use the 
land for an executive mansion or residence~ For a period 
·- of forty-six years. The most striking language in this 
~ [;· case, it seems to us, is that when the ·appellant did pro-
vide its Governor with a residence it did not use this !!: 
II· 
property but it used the Jennie J. !{earns' property. 'rhe 
~: appellant's answer. seems to be (appellant's brief, page 
ij 13) that the. property referred to in the deed of ~Salt L:ake 
City must be used "for son1e other purpose than a Gov-
ernor's mansion'' before a reverter will O'ccur. Appel-
.,;· lant does not find this language in the deed. The eon-
,., tention is drawn from its quotation taken from a few 
~~~ words in one paragraph of the deed (appellant's brief, 
of( page 14) ''but in case said property shall not be used 
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14 
* * * " . Surely the entire sentence is entitled to con-
sideratiori in the construction and determination of the 
1neaning of the deed. As will be seen.when the sentence 
is read in its ·entirety -or adding a pa!t deleted from the 
quotation ''for an executive mansion or a residence" 
that the contention is obviou~ly· an error. Its meaning is 
simply that the premises shall be used for an executive 
mansion.· Therefore appellant's ·contention that the 
pr~n1ises must be used :by appellant before a reverter oc-
curs and that the use ~ust he for a. purpose other than 
that descri~ed in the deed is not the proper construction 
of the language of the ·deed. 
· A reverter shall occur by operation of law as indi-
cated by appellant when the property is not used as a 
mansion or resid~nce of the. appellant's executive. 
The qualifications set out in the deed certainly do 
not carry the meaning that appellant may keep the fee 
in the -real property forever without making use of the 
property or until it attempts to use the pren1ises for a 
purpose other than a. ~Governor's residence. Such con-
struction "\vould permit the State to play "dog in the 
manger". It '\\TOuld deprive the Gran tee of the use {)f 
the land because Grant~e may only use it for the purpose 
limited by the deed. It would also deprive the Grantor 
of the use o.f the land because the fee rests in Grantee 
until a reverter occurs. The effe-ct of that construction 
would be to render the land. useless to anybody. There 
is no ambiguity in the limitation of the Grantor nor in 
the quality of the fee conveyed. 
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The terms of the deed are direct, simple and under-
standable. They become difficult only h~: reason of 
faulty argument. 
Appellant like"·ise is in error in its contention \Yith 
respect to the finding that appellant "had abandoned the 
use of the property conveyed to it by respondent and that 
the fee of the appellant terminated upon acceptance of 
the l{earns property \\ .. as not supported by competent 
evidence "Thieh could justify such a ·finding. * * * '' 
(See Appellant's brief, page 10). T,, .. o points are over-
looked here: one, the court found that appellant had 
alhandoned the use of said real property conveyed to it 
by Salt Lake City fo_r an executive mansion or residence 
(appellant's brief, page 6, Record page 26, Finding No. 
6), and two, there is no evidence before the court for its 
consideration and determination of whether or not the 
finding is supported by ''competent evidence.'' 'The pre-
:: sumption is that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
finding. The cases of appellant relating to the wbandon-
ment of property b): a fee owner are not in point. We 
• are here dealing \Vith a lin1ited fee which is subject to a 
{ possible reverter. The abandonment referred to in the 
finding is an abandonment of the use of the property for 
the purpose to 'vhich it vvas li1nited in the deed. The 
evidence is presumed to support such finding .. 
The appellant seems to be confused in its atte1npt 
to distinguish bet\veen an estate upon condition and an 
estate upon conditional limitation. The case of Yar-
borough v. Yarborough, (Tenn. 19·25) 269 S. W. 36, has 
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been cited on page 9 of its brief to illustrate such distinc-
tion. There are in fact by the writers considered as 
determina1ble fees four types. 
In the case of Teb~ow· v. Dougherty, (Mo. 1907), 103 
~s. W. 985, the court observes at page 988: 
"·There are four classes of such fees, viz., fee 
upon condition, fee upon limitation, a conditional 
limitation, and a fee e:onditional at common law." 
The various types of fees have been considered in 
cases which we will attempt to illustrate. 
F;EE UPON CoNDITION. 
·The fee upon condition is described very ·well in 
Vol. 1, Restatement of the La"r of Property, page 59, 
thus: 
''The term 'condition subsequent' denotes 
that part of the language of a conveyance, by 
virtue of which upon the oc:currence of a stated 
event the conveyor, or his successor in interest, 
has the power to terminate the interest which ha.s 
been created subj.ect to the condition subsequent, 
but which will c·ontinue until this power is exer-
cised. 
a. Applicability to both present and future 
interests. A eondition subsequent may be used 
to qualify either a present or a future interest. 
b. Power of Termination. "\Vhenever an 
estate .subject to a condition subsequent is created, 
s-ome person has the po,ver to tern1ina te this ps-
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tate upon the occurrence of the stipulated event. 
·Thus such an estate does not end automatically 
and by expiration as does an estate sulbject to a 
special limitation. On the contrary, it is ·cut 
.short, or divested, if, !hut only if, the person hav-
ing the power chooses to exercise it. T~is option 
to terminate an estate upon breach of a condition 
subsequent is referred to in this Restatement as 
a 'power of termination.' 
Special Note: The interest herein described 
as a 'power of termination' frequently is referred 
to as a 'right of entry.' This latter term is not 
used in this Restatement for two reasons. In the 
first place, the interest of the person in whose 
favor the condition exists, is not a 'right' as that 
word is defined in par. 1. It is a 'power' as that 
word is defined in par. 3. In the second place, 
under modern law, an entry is normally not nec:-
essary in order to terminate the interest subject 
to the condition. IDven if the instrument ere at-
ing the condition expressly reserves to the c-on-
veyor a 'power to ·enter and to terminate' the es-
tate created, no entry is essential. The interest 
subject to su'Ch a power is terminated by any ap-
propriate m·anifestation, upon the part of the per-
son in whose favor the condition -exists, of his in-
tent thereby to terminate the interest in ques-
tion.'' 
There is also what is known as a conditional fee 
which gave rise to estates tail. 10 R. C. L. Estates, 13 
P. 6'56. ,such fees are distinguished from fees upon 
condition a.s follows: 
In the case of Yates v. Ya;tes, (Neb. 1920) 178 N. W. 
262, at page 265, it will be ·observed that at common law 
estates limited to the heirs of the body of grantee were 
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known as conditional fees by reason that should the 
grantee die without the particular ~eirs, the land would 
revert to the grantor. (See 10 R. C. L. Estates 9, p. 654). 
f 
FEE UPON LIMITATION. 
In the case of Mills v. Da.vison, (N. J. 189'6) 35 Atl. 
107~2, the word ''limitation'' in its most technical sense 
when used in the habendum clause of a deed is an ap-
propriate term_ under which to declare the nature and 
extent of the estate .granted and the uses for which the 
grant is made. 
As to the distinction between conditional fees and 
limited fees, the court in_ the case of Smith v. Smith, 
(Wis. 186-8) 99 Amer. D~c., 1153, observed as follows: 
'
1
' There is n1uch subtile learning on the /hooks 1 
in regard to the · distinction bet~reen conditions 
and limitations in deeds so much that it is some-
times difficult to determine whether the 'vords 
used are words of condition, making the. estate 
voidable, or -words of limitation, making the es-
tate to c.e.ase. In Professor Green leaf'·s edition 
-of Cruise on Real P'roperty, title 13, chapte.r 2, 
section 64, the author says : 'Lord Coke mentions : 
a distinction between a condition· that defeats an 
estate, but requires a re~entry, and a limitation 
w·hich determines the estate ipso facto, without 
entry. Of the first sort, it has been shown that a 
stranger cannot 'take advantage; but -of limita-
tions it is otherwise; as, if a man makes a }e.ase 
quousque, that is, until J. S. returns from Rome; 
the less-or grants over the reversion to a stranger; 
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J. ,S. returns from R.ome; the grantee· of the re-
version may take advantag'e of the return of J. 
S., and enter, because the estate \Yas deterinined 
by au express limitation.' In the editor's note 1 
to this ~section, the different estates are distin-
guished in the following clear manner:-
'A condition is son1ething inserted for the 
benefit of the grantor, gi.ving hin1 the power, on 
default of performance, to destroy the estate if 
he 'vill, and revest the estate in himself or his 
heirs. As the law does not presume forfeiture, 
it requires some express art of the grantor, as 
evidenee of his intent to reclain1 the estate, viz., 
an entry. 
':A limitation is conclusive of the time of con-
tinuance and .of the extent of the estate granted, 
and beyond which it is declared at its creation not 
to be intended to continue. Conditions render the 
estate voidable by entry. Limitations render it 
void without entry. If upon failure of that upon 
which the estate is made to depend, no mutter ho'v 
expressed in the deed, the land is to go to a third 
per~son, this is a. limitation over, and not a condi-
tion. F'or if a condition, an entry by the grantor 
'vould be necess~ary; and he might defeat the limit-
ation by neglecting to enter. A limitation is im-
perative, and is determined 1by the rules of law. 
A condition not only depends on the option of the 
grantor, 1hut is also controlled by equity if the 
grantor attempts to make au inequitable use of 
it. The performance of a condition is excused by 
the act of God, or of the law, or of the p~arty for 
whos·e benefit it was made. A limitation deter-
mines the estate absolutely, whatever be its 
nature.' 
·See also 11 American Jurist, page 42, for an 
instructive article on this branch of the la-\v. '' 
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A C'ONDITIONAL LIMITATION. 
A conditional limitation is of a mixed nature and in 
the ease of Smi.th v. Smith~ supra, was defined by Chan-
cellor Kent as follows, p. 15~5: 
''A .c~onditional limitation is of a mixed na-
ture, and partakes of a condition and a limita-
tion; as, if an estate be limited to A for life, pro-
vided that when ·C return from Rome it shall 
thenceforth r~main to the use of .B in fee, it par-
takes of the na:ture of a condition, inasmuch as it 
defeats the estate pr·eviously limited; and is so 
far a limitation; and to be distinguished from a 
c.ondition, that upon the contingency taking place, 
the estate passes to the stranger without entry, 
contrary to the maxim of law, that a stranger can-
not take advantage of a condi•tion broken.'' 4 
Kent's Com. 128. 
The distinction 'between a conditiona-l fee and a con-
ditional limitation is found in the ease of City NatiotW.l 
B·~k v. City of Bridgepo·rt, (Conn. 1929) 147 Atl. 181, at. 
page 185: 
. ''One distinguishing charac.teristic as b~-
tween these two forms of estates IS that 'a condi-
tion ·brings the estate back to the grantor or his 
heirs; a condiltional limitation carries it over to 
a stranger.' 21 C·orpus Juris, p. 930. 'In the cast) 
of .a. condition the estate or thing is given ab-
solutely vvithout limitation, but the title is subj.ect 
to be divested ·by the happening or not happenmg 
of an uncer'tain ·event. Wher·e, on the contrary, 
the thing or estate is granted or given until an 
event shall 4:a.ve arrived, and not generally with 
a liability to ihe defeated by the happ·ening of the 
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event, the estate is said to be g·iven or granted 
subject to a linlitation.' ~ Bouvier's In st. 275; 2 
Bl C 1 ~~ ,, · . om. tJ;J. 
A FEE CoNDITIONAL AT ColVIlVION LAw. 
A conditional fee at common lavv is well defined in 
. the case of Wi.Uis v. Mutual Loa;n & Tru,st Co., (N. C. 
1922) 111 S. E. 163, at page 165: 
"A conditional fee, at the con1mon law, was 
a fee restrained to son1e particular heirs, exclu-
sive of others, * * :;(, as the heirs of a man's 
body. * * * No,v, 'vith regard to· the condi-
tion annexed to these fees by the common law, 
our ancestors held that such a gift (to a man and 
the heirs of his body) was a gift upon condition 
that it should revert to the donor if the donee had 
no heirs of his body; but, if he had, it should then 
remain to the donee. They the ref ore called it a 
fee simple, on condition that he had issue.'' 2 Bl. 
Com. 110. "Which condition was implied in the 
words as well as in the intent; for in that the gift 
is to one and to his heirs of llis body, and no fur-
ther, therein it is implied that, if he have no heirs 
of his body, the donor shall have the land again.'' 
Willi on v. BerkleyJ Plowd. 23"5. 
S.ee also· 10 R,. C. L. E·states 9, page 654. 
A DETERlVIIXABLE FEE IN THis CASE HAs R.EVERTED 
TO GRANTOR. 
!~· The appellant in this cas·e aptly observes that the 
~ fee gr.anted by the deed of ,salt Lake City to appellant 
: was a limited fee. As is pointed out in appellant's brief, 
~ page 8, in its quotation of the la.w of property from Sec-
~i 
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tion 23, a limited fee has been defined to automatically 
expire upon the occurrence of a stated event. As is used 
in this re-staternent, the word lin1itation normally de-
notes the complete language of a conv·eyanee delimiting 
the duration .and character of a created interest. This 
is observed in 25 "\V ords & Phrases at page 300, where 
the author further o1bserves: ''The \vord is also used in 
this re-statement distributedly to denote a part of the 
limitation. '' 
The appellant contends that the property should be 
used 1by the State of Utah before the reverter occurs. 
That Vlould seem to imply that there is a. condition at-
tached to the deed l.n question. A fair construction of 
the deed does not disclose such a condition. A distinction 
·between a condition and a limitation has heretofore 
been pointed out in the ease of Board of Chosen. Free-
holders v. Buck, (N. J. 19·12) 82 Atl. 418, at page 420, 
where the court observes : 
., 'A distinction is, hovvever, made between a 
condition in deed and a limitation, which Little~ 
ton denominates, also, a condition in law. For, 
when an estate is so expressly confined and limited 
by the words of its creation that it cannot endure 
for any longer time than till the contingency hap-
pens upon which the estate is to fall, this is de· 
nominated a limitation, as when land is granted 
to a man, so long as. he is p·a.rson of Dale, or 
while he .eontinue unmarried, or until out of the 
rents and profits he shall have made £500., and 
the" like. In such case the estate determines as 
soon as the contingency happens ('vhen he ceases 
to be a parson, n1arries a wife, or has received 
111111 
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£500.) and the next subsequent estate, \Yhieh de-
pends upon such determination, becomes irnmedi-
a.tely vested, 'vithout any act to be done by hint 
who is next -in expectancy. But 'vhen an estate 
is, strictly \speaking, upon condition in deed (as 
if granted expressly upon condition to be void 
upon the payment of £40. by the grantor, or so 
that the gTantee continues unmarried, or provided 
he goes to York, etc.) the law pern1its it to endure 
beyond the time when such contingency happens, 
unless the grantor or his heirs or assigns take ad-
vantage of the breach of the condition, and make 
either an entry or a claim in order to avoid the 
estate.'' ·See also, 4 l{ent 's Commentaries~ *126. 
''It will thus be observed that, "\vhile i1t may at 
times become difficult to determine 'vhether a 
given provision in .a deed or devise is to be recog-
nized as a condition or a mere covenant _or trust, 
the essential qualities and eharacteristics of a 
limitation a.re too clearly defined to he easily con-
fused. The words 'provided' or 'on condition'. 
though appropriate to the creation of a condition, 
may .also be appropriately used to introduce a 
covenant or trust (Mackenzie v. Trustees of Pres-
bytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 61 Atl. 
1027, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 22'7; Mills v. D1avison, 54 
N.J. Eq. 659, 3-5 Atl. 1072, 35 L. R. A. 113, 55 Am . 
.St. Rep. 594) ; but the words 'so long as' followed 
by the V\10l'ds 'and no longer' can have but one 
significance, in the absence of some element clear-
ly. disclosing that they were not designed to de-
feat the estate granted at the expiration of the 
period of time named. 
The provisions of the deed here in question 
so clearly and adequately ere ate a limitation that 
no field for construction appears to exist. The 
habendum of the deed, '\vhich is wholly consistent 
with all its other parts, and therefore deternlines 
what estate is granted, is, 'T·o have and to hold, 
* * ,~, so long· as the same shall be used for 
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:( 
the purposes her~in 'before mentioned and no 
longer.' The period named marks the limitation ~; 
of the estate as to time; at the end of that period 
the determinable estate ceases, and the fee vest~ -· 
in the grantor, ·Or his heirs, by reverter. The 
words 'so long as the same shall be used for the 
purposes herein before mentioned' are sufficient 
for the creation of a limitation; the added words 
'and no longer' rem·ove all possibility of doubt 
touching the quality of the estate granted. It is , 
·clearly impossible to regard this language as not 
having been intended to defeat the estate granted, · 
or as in th~ nature of a c:ovenant or trust.'' 
As a citation of authority f.or appeUant's point, as 
above noted, the case of Y.arborough v. Yarborough, 
supra, has been cited at page 9' of his brief, but it will 
be observed by carefully reading that case, the whole 
estate was passed to grantee and an estate was created 
to arise in .a third pers.on. A bare fee determinable as 
we find in the instant case· was not created and the limita-
tion was over in favor of a. third person, to-wit, the own-
ers of the original traet, and not to the grantor as is the 
fact in the instant case. The court· in the cited case held 
that the limitation over in a third person destroyed the 
idea that if was the intention of the grantor to create a 
simple fee determinable and obs-erved at page 38, '''when 
a determinable fee ends, the estate reverts to the grantor 
and his heirs.'' 
The court very aptly points out in the above cited 
ease the difference between an estate in fee on condition 
and on ~a. conditionallimit~tion thus, that the fee on con-
dition leaves in the grantor a vested right, while a fee 
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,, on conditional limitation passes the vvhole interest to the 
: grantor at once and creates an ·estate to arise and vest 
~~ in ·a third person upon a c:ontingency at a future and un-
~: certain time. It ,v.ould occur to us that the authority is 
~: 
~~ not applicable to the facts in this case. 
~ ~~ ·The appellant further cites on page 10 of its brief, 
Ill 51 A. L. R .. 1466 and 1473. 'These citations illustrate the 
t 
distinction between estates upon condition and estates 
: upon conditional limitation. They do not consider limit-
ed fees. 
The citation ·On the same page, to-wit, 77 A. L. R. 
,.._ 
345 (Note ·2), is coneerned with the inheritability of pos-
.- s~bilities of reverter arising on the creation of fees of 
~ less estate than fee simple absolute including c:onditional 
- fees, determinable feeis and fees ·conditional and in part-
.,._ icular (note ·2) referred to relates to the distinction be-
i.i tween possibilities of fee determinable, fees on condi-
!iUH tion and ·Conditional £ees. Here the author refers to a 
f01§ limited fee as a qualified or determinable fee and defines 
~ it ·as a fee terminating ipso facto upon the happening of 
r~~ a specified contingency. ·The determinable fee or quali-
~; ·. fied fee is distinguished from the fee on ·condition which 
j: the author desc.ribes as a fee subject to a re-entry on 
the happening of a specified c.ondition. ·The determin-
able fee is further distinguish-ed from a ·conditional fee. 
f 
That is a. fee limited to the grantee and the heirs of his 
lD~ body, which fee is probably better des·cribed in the ease 
f~l of Ma,tlock v. Locke, (Ind. 1905) 37 N. E. 171. It would 
~ 
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occur to us, therefore, that neither of these citations are 
in point. 
As a1bove -observed, the f~e in the instant case is a 
liinited fee so long as the premises are used as a resi-
dence -or mansion for the executive of Utah. It is the 
fee described as the fee upon limitation. Most writers 
refer to the limited fee when discussing the determinable 
or qualified or base fee. All of the various types of fee 
a.re sometin1es considered under the head determinable 
fe·e and therefore the reader must be very .careful when 
the subj.ect is followed to discern just what character of 
a. fee is referred to. 
A determinable fee is generally defined as follows, 
19 Amer .. Jur., Estates 28, page 486: 
' . 
"·The definition ·most often quoted by the 
·courts, vvhich is valuable because, a1though sweep-
ing,- it incl:udes within its purview the fundament-
al incidents of the estate defined, states that a 
~ determinabl,e '', 'qualified,' ·or 'base' fee is on 
estate limited to a person and his heirs, with a 
·qualifieation annexed 'to it by which it is provided 
that it must determine whenever that qualifica-
tion is at an end. Be~cause the ~estate may last 
forever, it is a. fee; and because it may end on the 
happening ·of 13.n event, it is called a "determin-
able or qualified f,ee.' Chancellor l{ent uses the 
words 'qualified,' 'base,' and 'determinable' fee 
promiscuously as defining an estate whi·ch may 
continue forever, ibut is liable to !be determined 
without the aid of a conveyance by some ·a.ct or 
event circumscribing its continuance ·Or extent. He 
adds: '·Though the object on \Yhich it rests for 
perpetuity may be transitory or perishable, yet 
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such estates are deemed fees, because, it is said, 
they haYe a possibilit~· of enduring foreve.r ... It 
is the uncertainty of the event and the poss1b1hty 
that the f.ee may last foreYer thn t renders the e~s­
ta te a fee, and not merely a freehold.' In his 
historic \York on Estates, Preston re1narked: 
'Thoug·h the estate w·ill determine \Yhen the event 
marked as the boundary to the time of continu-
ance shall happen, in the meantime the whole 
estate is in the grante.e or owner, subject only to 
a possiqility of reverter in the grantor. The 
grantee has an estate which may continue forever, 
though there is a contingency \vhich, \vhen it hap-
pens, will deternune the estate. 'This eontingency 
cannot, with propriety, be called a 'condition;' it 
is pa.rt of the limitation, and the estate may be 
termed a '.fee.' Plo\Yden uses the phrase .'fee 
simple determinable.' " 
In 8 R. C. L. Deeds, S~ection 157, at page 1100, a 
t. 
distinction is made between estates on· condition and 
... , estates upon limitation, and also estates upon conditional 
[ 
, · limitation, thus: 
:t: 
i :"' 
''The essential difference bet-\veen an estate 
on condition and an estate in fee determining on 
the happening of some future unc.ertain but pos-
sible event, with a limitation over conditioned on 
the happening of the event, is that in the latter case 
on the happening of the event the estate -either 
reverts to the grantor or is carried by force of 
the deed to the person to whom it was granted, 
while in th~ former the .grantc;>r must have either 
expressly or 1by necessary implication reserved to 
himself or hi~ heir~s a right of entry on breach of 
the condition, re-entry being necessary to rev.est 
the estate. A condition is inserted for the bene-
fit of the grantor, giving him the po\ver, on de-
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fault ·Of performance, to destroy the estate if he 
·will. By failure to enter he may defeat the con-
di~ion, an~,. u~der certain _ci~cu~sta_nces, equity 
m1ght forb1d h1s entry. A hm1tat1on IS conclusive 
of the time of continuance and of the extent of 
the estate granted, beyond which it is declared at 
its creation not to be intended to continue, and 
not only is no act ne-cessary on the part of the 
grantor to terminate the estate, but the limitation 
is imperative and under the rules of law deter-
mines the estate absolutely, whatever be its na-
ture. A conditional limitation is of a mixed na-
ture, and partakes of a condition and a. limita-
tion; as, if an estate be limited to one for life, 
provided on the happening of some ·other event 
it shall thenceforth remain to the use of another 
in fee, it partakes of the natur·e of a 1c.ondition, 
inasmuch as it defeats the estate previously limit-
ed, and is so far a limitation ~and to be distin-
guished from a condition that on the contingency 
taking place th~ estate passes to the stranger 
-w.nthout entry, ~contrary to :the maxim !that a 
st:vanger cannot take advantage of a condition 
broken.'' 
·The event which marked the end of the fee granted 
by 1S!alt Lake ·City to the State of Utah in the. deed under 
consideration was the time when the premises were no 
longer to. be used as an executive 1nansion. The court 
found that the event had occurred, Record pages 24, 25, 
26, that the premises were no longer to be used 3JS an 
executive 1nansion, as is oihserved by R.e-statement of the 
Law of Property, Vol. 1, page 19'5, S·ee. 56: 
''·On the occurrenc-e of the event on which an 
estate in fee simple defeasible is effectively limit-
ed to end in accordance with the terms of either 
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a special limitation or an executory limitation, 
such estate immediately .ceases. It is not neces-
sary that the holder of the next succeeding in-
terest take any action to terminate the estate.'' 
, In the case of U. 8. Pipeline Company v. Delaw-a.re, 
~ (N. J. 1898) cited in 42 L. R. A. 572, where the convey-
~ ance made was. so long as suitarble wag-on road was main-
: tained, the court observed at page 578: 
''·The qualifying '\Yords in· the habendum 
clause, 'to have and to hold', etc., 'unto the said 
the Morris & Essex Railroad Company, and their 
successors and assigns, forever, for all purposes 
mentioned in said act of incorporation and the 
several supplements thereto passed and to he 
passed,' are simply a. qualification of the fee that 
inured to the company by the operative w-ords of 
grant. '·Of fee sin1ple,' says L·ord ·Coke, 1' it is 
commonly· holden that there .be three kinds, viz., 
fee simple absolute, fee simple conditional, and 
fee simple qualified, or a base fee. But the more 
genuine .and apt division were to divide fee, that 
is, inheritance, into three p1a.rts, viz., simple or 
absolute, conditional, and quali·fied or base. For 
this word (simple) properly excludeth both con-
ditions and limitations, that defeat or abridge the 
fee.' 1 Inst. lb. 'Where an estate limited to a 
person and his heirs has a qualification annexed 
t.o it, by which it is provided that it must deter-
mine \Yhenever that qualification is at an end, it 
is then called a qualified or base fee. As in the 
ca·se of a grant to A and his heirs, tenants of the 
manor ·of D·ale, '\Vhenever the heirs of A cease to 
be tenants of the manor of D·ale, their estate de-
ternlines.' 1 Cruise, Dig. 63 ( *79) 1 In st. 27 a. 'If 
. land is given to a man and to his heirs as long as 
he shall pa ~· 20s. annually to A or as long as the 
ehurch of Rt. l)aul shall stand, his estate is a fee 
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simpl~ determinable, in \Yhich cHsc he has the 
\vhole estate in him; and such per:petuity of an 
estate which may continue forever, though at the 
same time there is a contingency w·hich when it 
happens \vill detern1ine the estate (which contiu-
gency cannot properly !he called a condition, 'hut 
a. limitation), m•ay be termed a fee sin1ple deter-
minable.' (\V alsingha~ 's Case) 2 P1owd. 55i. 
'Though the estate will deternline \\7hen the event 
marked as the boundary to the time of continuance 
.shall happen, in the meantin1e the \Vhole estate is 
in the grantee or o\vner, subject· only to a. possi-
bility of reverter in the grantor. The grantee 
has an estate w·hich may continue forever, though 
there is a contingency which, \vhen it happens, will 
determine the estate. This contingency ·cannot. 
with propriety, be called a C·ondition; it is part 
of the lin1itation: and the est~ate may be termed 
a. fee. Plo\Yden uses the phrase 'fee simple deter-
minable.' 1 Preston, Estates, 431, 441, 442, 484. 
·:Chancellor l{ent uses the \vords 'qualified,' 'base,' 
or 'determinable' fee promiscuously as defining 
an estate \Yhich may continue forever, but is liable 
to be detern1ined \Vithout the aid -of •a c-onveyance 
by so-me act or event eircumscribii1g its continu-
ance or ·extent. And he adds : '·Though the object 
on which it rests for perpetuity m,ay be transitory 
or perisha,ble, yet such estates are deemed fees, 
!because, it is said, they have a possibility of en-
during forever '~' * *. It is the uncertaint~· of 
the event, and the possibility that the fee may 
last forever, that renders the estate a fee, and not 
merely a. freehold.' 4 Kent, ·Con1. p. 9. ''The prop· 
rietor of a qualified or base fee has the sa1ne rights 
and privileges over his estate, till the qualific,a.tion 
upon \Vhich it is limited is at an end, as if he were 
a tenant in fee simple!' 1 Crp.ise Dig. 65 (*79) 
Plo,vd. 5:57; 4 l{ent, Com. p. 11; ,Seymour's Case, 
10 C-oke 97a; 1 Preston, Estates, 484. 'So long.as 
the qualified fee remained, the grantor or his heu·s 
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had no right of entering· upon the lands. If the 
estate granted was terminated by breach of the 
condition, then the 'vhole estate 'vas gone, and 
there could be no partial forfeiture. He who en-
ters for breach ·Of condition regularly shall have 
the land of his first estate. '0'0. Litt. 202a.; Com-
,yns' Dig. p. ·533 (06); per ~Chief Justice Green, 
MeKelway v. Seymour, 29 N. ,J. I.~. 3'2.9." 
In the case of Mills v. Davison, ('N.J. 189~6) 35 Atl. 
- . 
, 1072, at pag·e 1073, where the deed read: 
''·T-o have and to hold unto the said party of 
the second part and their successors forever, with 
this express condition and limitation: that neither 
the said party of the second part, nor their suc-
cessors, shall at •any time sell, mortgag~, or in 
any way convey the said land and premises, or any 
part thereof, and that no building shall be kept, 
maintained, or erected thereon, except for the 
purpos~ of public worship and teaching in accord-
ance with the usages, rites, and ceremonies of the 
protestant Episcopal Church in the United 1States 
of .1\merica, and also except the proper -outbuild-
ings ·appurtenant thereto.'' 
.~ the court observed at page 107·5 : 
~: '''Th~ language of the habendum plainly in-
:~ dicates a conveyance for use exclusively for pub-
·~ lie worship and teaching in c-onformity with the 
~ rites and .eeremonies of the Protestant ~Episcopal 
# Church.'' 
r.1 In the case of Awmiller v. Dash, (Wash. 1909) 99 
:· Pac. 583, a fee descri!bed '·'so long as said party * * * 
~ shall use s~a.id strip of land for a private way * * * 
Ill 
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and no longer'' was held to be a determinable or qualified 
f~e. 
In the .case of McGaha;n v. MoGah01n, (Ind. 192·6) 151 
N. E. 6'27, where the deed read: '·'And for a further con-
sideration that at the death of Ella J. McGahan that the 
above described land .shall revert back to ~Simeon Mc-
Gahan, ' ' the court held at page 629': 
''A fair interpretation of the clause, and its 
effect upon the .granting clause, is that it created 
what in common law was ·called a 'base fee'-a fee 
which was to determine upon the happening of a 
certain event.'' 
·In the case of White v. Kevr~Atling, (Mo. 19'39) 134 
S. W. ('2d) 3~9, where the dee:q read at page 41, "that 
when such real estate was no longer used by the Bank of 
Highlandville for a bank, that the same reverted to the 
grantors or their assigns," the court held at page 44: 
,., A reversion ipso facto is expressly provided for," and 
at page 45: '·'The rights ·of the bank or its assignees, 
however, will automatically cease and det~rmine if the 
land is not used for the purpose of a hank. * * *'' 
In the case ·of Puffer v. Clark, (Mich. 1918) 168 N. \Y. 
471, the -conveyance required the premises to be used as 
a home for ministers of a church (page 472) or revert 
to gran tor and the court held at pag~ 480: 
· "IThey -conveyed, however, a conditional or 
qualified fee, absolute until the condition is broken, 
cand if broken the heirs of the gran tor take by 
right of reverter.'' 
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In the case of U·nivcrsify of Ty erntont and St.ate AgT. 
College r. Ward, (Vt. 19132) 158 Atl. 773, a lease as long 
, as the grass gro\vs and the \Yater runs was urged to be 
~ a fee and \vhile the court denied the contention by reason 
. of a statute under \Yhich the lease \Yas given, it held at 
... 
~ page 776: 
~ 
•· 
il 
• 'A determinable fee is a fee-simple estate 
to a person and his heirs \vith a qualification an-
nexed to it ;by which it is provided that it must 
determine whenever the qualification is at an end. 
·Common instances given in the books are a. limita-
tion to one and his heirs so long a.s a certain tret 
stands, or so long as A and his heirs shall pay B 
a certain sum per annum, or so long as the prop-
erty conveyed is used for a certain specified pur-
pose. Such an estate may remain forever, or it 
may terminate on the happening of the contin-
gency upon which the estate is limited.'' 
In the cas·e of Gillespie v. Broas, (1N. Y. 185'6) 23 
Barbour's ,Supreme Court Reports 370, the court ob~ 
served at page 376 : 
"The duration of the estate in the premises, 
is, in terms, specified to he as long as they 'shall 
lbe used and occupied for a county site for the 
court house, jail and clerk's office of said county 
of 1Schuyler;' and a limitation of the e.state to 
that period is expresly imposed, by adding, that 
'when said lot ·Or premises shall cease to be used !or the purposes .aforesaid, then the sa.me, with 
Its appurtenances thereunto belonging, is to revert 
and belong to the party of the first part, his heirs, 
executors, administrators or assigns, the same as 
if this c-onveyance had not been executed.' 'The 
effect of this specification and limitation is to 
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make the estate a quali~fied or d~terminable fee-
an estate which may continue forever, but which 
is defeasible or conditional on an event provided 
for. If the county should cease to use the lot or 
premises. in the manner mentioned,· 'the estate 
created by the deed w·ould thereby be determined. 
and the title to the premises, including all build~ 
ings thereon, be revested in the grantor or his 
heirs. ( 4 Kent's Coni. 9, 1'29). '' 
Limited fees are considered in 10 R. C. L. Estates, 
par. 8, page 652, thusly: 
''Limited fees are estates of inheritance which 
are restricted by or dependent upon the c.ondi-
. tions ·Or qualifications. They are divided into two 
classes: first, qualified ·or determinable fees, ·Or 
such as are frequently referred ·to as base fees; 
second, fees conditional, which after the statqte 
debonis become fees tail. A qualified or determin-
able fee is an estate limited to a person and his 
heirs, \vith a qualification annexed to it by which 
it is provided that it must determine whenever 
that qua1ifica tion is at an end. Because the estate 
may last forever it is a fee, and beeause it may 
end ·On the happening of the event it is called a 
determinable or qualified fee. Thus, where an 
estate is conveyed in fee for a specified purpose 
'apd no other,' the fee is a qualified fee, deter-
minable upon the cessation of the use of the prop-
erty for that purpose; and the same character of 
estate is conveyed where the grant is in fee with 
a remainder over upon the proviso that the 
grantee die without heirs, or 'vhere, in default of 
heirs, the land reverts to the donor. The rule i~ 
that the mere expression of a purpose will not 
of and by itself debase a fee; and though the 
qualification must be found in the instru1nent it-
self, no special or technical 'vords are required. 
The \vords 'so long as,' or 'during the time that,' 
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the property is used for a certain purpose, nsua 1-
ly create an estate subject to determination up_on 
conclusion of that use, rather than a fee w1th 
.condition subsequent. So clearly a deed provid-
ing that the land shall revert to the donor when-
ever it c.eases to be used or occupied for a speci-
fied purpose creates a 'determinable or qualified 
fee.' A deed t.o a wife 'for during and so long as 
she shall live, or remain a \\ridow,' creates a life 
estate, determinable upon her remarriage. Nat-
withstanding the condition subsequently written 
in the deed if the .estate is liable to become ab-
solute, and continue perpetually in the first taker, 
his or her heirs and assigns, the deed creates in 
the donee a fee .simple conditional, or a fee of a 
determinaible or conditional ·character, and not an 
estate .. or condition subsequent. The proprietor of 
a determinable fee so long as the estate in fee 
remains, until the contingency upon which the 
estate is limited occurs, has all the rights and pri-
vileges over it that he would have if tenant in fee 
simple. After such a grant no right of seisin or 
possession remains in the grantor; all the estate 
is in the grantee notwithstanding the qualifica-
tion. Nothing remains in th~ grantor but a pos-
sibility ·Or right of reverter, which does not con-
stitute an actual estate, and consequently it is not 
the subject of devise, inheritance or grant. Such 
a possibility of reverter is, however, capable at 
all times of being released to- the person holding 
the estate or his grantee, and if so released vests 
an absolut~ ~and indefeasible title thereto; and 
if the .event ·Occurs upon which the fee is limited, 
the property reverts to the grantor without any 
claim or act on his part.'' · 
'There can be no argument that the State of Utah 
~- does not use the land in question for the purpose limited. 
,1,, It has held the land fo.rty-six years unused, by Legisla-
~ 
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tive Act determined to use other property and since has 
actually used other property for its executive. mansion. 
Furthermore, the eourt has found that the appellant's 
fee has determined. That evidence cannot here be as-
sail~ d. We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
·District Court should be sustained. 
R.espect.fully, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney, 
GERALD IRVINE, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assista;nt City Attorneys. 
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